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Abstract—Network intrusion detection systems identify mali-
cious connections and thus help protect networks from attacks.
Various data-driven approaches have been used in the devel-
opment of network intrusion detection systems, which usually
lead to either very complex systems or poor generalization
ability due to the complexity of this challenge. This paper
proposes a data-driven network intrusion detection system using
fuzzy interpolation in an effort to address the aforementioned
limitations. In particular, the developed system equipped with a
sparse rule base not only guarantees the online performance of
intrusion detection, but also allows the generation of security
alerts from situations which are not directly covered by the
existing knowledge base. The proposed system has been applied
to a well-known data set for system validation and evaluation
with competitive results generated.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cyber security has become an elevated risk that is amongst
the most pressing issues affecting businesses, governments,
other organisations, and even individuals. This issue is ex-
pected to become more important in time, as more devices,
i.e., ‘the Internet of Things’, are becoming connected to the
Internet. Network security is the most important challenge in
the field of cyber security, knowing that networks provide
the essential access to others which need to be protected in
cyberspace, including the computer systems and data. Serious
network attacks can lead to damages on computer systems,
network paralysis, data loss or leakage. Network intrusion
detection systems (IDS) attempt to identify unauthorised, il-
licit, and anomalous behaviour based solely on network traffic
to support decision making in network preventive actions by
network administrators.
There are basically two types of IDSs, which inspect
suspicious traffic through either signatures or anomaly. The
signature-based approaches attempt to classify a network
connection based on an already known signature knowledge
base [1]. These approaches are only applicable to the detec-
tion of already known types of threats. Differently, anomaly
detection approaches, such as [2], are introduced to also detect
unknown types of attacks by identifying the behaviour of the
network traffic that does not conform to any expected pattern in
their knowledge bases. Common to both types of approaches
is the requirement of a well-covered data set or knowledge
base, which is not always readily available or obtainable. In
addition, the resultant system may be very complex if sufficient
data is available. This paper proposes a novel IDS using fuzzy
interpolation approaches to address these limitations.
Fuzzy interpolation, initially proposed in [3], enhances
conventional fuzzy inference systems, such as the Mamdani
and the TSK approaches, to work with sparse rule bases
which do not cover the entire problem domain [4]. In other
words, when observations or system inputs do not overlap
with any rule antecedents in the rule base, no rule can be
fired by traditional fuzzy inference systems and thus out-
puts/conclusions can not be generated. However, by applying
fuzzy interpolation, conclusions still can be obtained by means
of interpolation. Note that, fuzzy interpolation also helps in
system complexity reduction by removing those rules which
can be approximated by their neighbours in the rule base.
Various fuzzy interpolation methods working with Mamdani-
style sparse rule bases have been developed and applied to real
world-applications successfully, including [5]–[19].
TSK inference systems have also been extended to deal
with sparse rule bases [20] (named as TSK-style fuzzy in-
terpolation), given that sparse TSK-style rule bases may be
resulted from a data-driven approach. This is also the case for
the development of IDS in this project because the data set
for network traffic is often sparse and imbalanced (i.e., some
parts of the data set are dense and others are sparse). TSK-
style fuzzy interpolation is built upon a modified similarity
measure which calculates the similarity degrees between ob-
servations and rule antecedents. Different with the similarity
measure used in the traditional TSK approach, the modified
one always leads to a greater-than-0 similarity degree between
any observation and rule antecedent even when they do not
overlap at all. Thanks to this property, a global consequence
can always be generated by integrating the results from all
rules in the rule base.
The proposed IDS is built upon the TSK-style fuzzy
interpolation. Having known the inference mechanism as in-
troduced above, a 0-order TSK rule base is generated from
historical traffic data. Firstly, the classical clustering algorithm
K-Means is employed to group similar objects (data points)
into clusters in terms of their Euclidean distances in the multi-
dimensional problem domain. Then, each identified cluster of
data is expressed as one TSK fuzzy rule. Finally, the generated
TSK rule base comprises of rules which represent all the
clusters. Thanks to the relaxation on rule base requirement,
the proposed IDS is not only able to generate security alerts
for known attack types, but also to detect potential unknown
threats, as demonstrated in the experimentation.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section II
introduces the theoretical underpinnings of fuzzy interpolation,
with a focus on the TSK fuzzy interpolation upon which this
work is built. Section III presents the details of the proposed
IDS system. Section IV describes the experimentation for
demonstration and validation. Section V concludes the paper
and suggests possible future developments.
II. BACKGROUND
TSK-style fuzzy interpolation is able to perform fuzzy
inferences on a sparse TSK rule base, which is introduced
in the first part of this section. This is followed by a brief
review of the existing network IDSs developed using artificial
intelligence approaches.
A. TSK-Style Fuzzy Interpolation
Traditional TSK system generates a crisp inference result
from a given input by calculating the weighted average of
the sub-consequences of all fired rules [21]. Obviously, if a
given input does not overlap with any rule antecedent, the
firing strength of all rules will be 0, and consequently, no
consequence can be derived. TSK-interpolation has addressed
such issue [20]. Assume that a sparse TSK rule base is
comprised of n rules as follows:
R1 : IF x1 is A11 and x2 is A
1
2 and ¨ ¨ ¨ and xm is A1m
THEN z “ Z1,
... ...
Ri : IF x1 is Ai1 and x2 is A
i
2 and ¨ ¨ ¨ and xm is Aim
THEN z “ Zi,
... ...
Rn : IF x1 is An1 and x2 is A
n
2 and ¨ ¨ ¨ and xm is Anm
THEN z “ Zn,
(1)
where n represents the size of the rule base (i.e., the number
of rules included in the rule base); Aik, pi P t1, 2, ¨ ¨ ¨ , nu and
k “ t1, 2, ¨ ¨ ¨ ,muq represents a normal and convex fuzzy
set. For simplicity, only triangular membership functions are
utilised in this work, and thus Aik is conveniently denoted
as (aik1, a
i
k2, a
i
k3), where (a
i
k1, a
i
k3) is the support of the
fuzzy set and aik2 is the normal point. Given an input
I “ pA1˚ , A2˚ , ¨ ¨ ¨ , Am˚q which may or may not overlap with
any rule antecedents, a crisp output can always be generated
by following the steps below.
Step 1: Determine the matching degrees SpA1˚ , Ai1),
SpA2˚ , Ai2q, ¨ ¨ ¨ , and SpAm˚, Aimq between the inputs
(A1˚ , A2˚ , ¨ ¨ ¨ , Am˚) and rule antecedents (Ai1, Ai2, ¨ ¨ ¨ , Aim)
for each rule Ri (i P 1, 2, ¨ ¨ ¨ , n) by:
SpAik, A˚kq “
˜
1´
3ÿ
j“1
|aikj ´ a˚kj |
3
¸
¨ pDF q , (2)
where DF , termed as distance factor, is a function of the
distance between the two concerned fuzzy sets. DF is in turn
defined as:
DF “ 1´ 1
1` e´hd`5 , (3)
where h (h ą 0) is a sensitivity factor, and d represents the
distance between the two fuzzy sets. Smaller value of h leads
to a similarity degree which is more sensitive to the distance
of two fuzzy sets, and vice versa.
Step 2: Calculate the firing degree of each rule by inte-
grating the matching degrees of its antecedents and the given
input values:
αi “ SpA1˚ , Ai1q ^ SpA2˚ , Ai2q ^ ¨ ¨ ¨ ^ SpAm˚, Aimq , (4)
where ^ is a t-norm usually implemented as a minimum
operator.
Step 3: Integrate the sub-consequences from all rules to
get the final output:
z “
řn
i“1 αi ¨ Znřn
i“1 αi
. (5)
B. Network Intrusion Detection
Data are sliced into a number of units during transmission
over Ethernet. Each unit of data, named a packet, is formed
by adding an extra header section on the top of the transmitted
unit of data. Based on the packet headers, important features
regarding the corresponding data transaction can be identified,
such as the source and destination IP addresses, the total
length of the formatted data unit, and the source/destination
ports. From this, the traffic pattern or signature of each data
transmission in the network environment can be identified by
analysing the information included in the IP headers. These
traffic patterns and signatures are commonly utilised by IDSs
to identify potential threats in a network environment, thus to
generate security alerts.
Soft computing algorithms have been widely employed
for the development of IDSs [22], to enable an intelligent
agent in the system that is capable of disclosing the latent
patterns in abnormal and normal connection audit records, and
to generalise the patterns to new connection instances of the
same class. For instance, the use of artificial immune systems
in intrusion detection aims to take the challenge of defending
increasingly complex networks in a dynamic environment.
IDSs have also been developed using artificial neural networks,
each of which is composed of a number of neurones that are
interconnected with each other with different weights. Genetic
algorithm based IDSs utilise biological concepts of natural
selection, that is, survival of the fittest. Fuzzy logic has been
employed in either fuzzy inference based IDSs or fuzzified
other soft computing approaches to handle uncertainty.
Amongst the existing fuzzy logic based IDSs, D-FRI-
Snort [23] was developed using a dynamic fuzzy rule inter-
polation approach. This system provides an additional level of
intelligence to Snort alongside with the liability of creating a
dynamic rule base, which enhances the prediction capability
of the original Snort. In particular, D-FRI-Snort starts with
network traffic data collection and analysis using three fea-
tures: the average packet time, the number of packets sent and
received. Threat alerts are generated to indicate an additional
threat level if advised by the existing rule base. The system
also stores interpolated results and dynamically promotes new
rules based on the collected interpolated rules to enhance the
original Snort according to the current network conditions.
III. INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEM
The proposed IDS is essentially a fuzzy inference system
which comprises of an inference engine and a rule base. The
inference engine has been discussed in Section II-A. The
construction of the rule base and the adaptation of the inference
engine for network intrusion detection are detailed below. For
simplicity, in this work, the modelling is supposed to take place
under a noise free network environment. Also, only normal and
convex triangle fuzzy sets are employed in fuzzy modelling.
A. Feature Selection and Data Collection
A number of general features can be readily monitored by
networking tools for networking analysis during data packet
transmission over the network, but most of them are irrelevant
to intrusion detection and some are redundant. Therefore, a
well-thought feature selection process by experts often takes
place for the task of network attack detection [24]. This
widespread practice is also employed in this work. In particu-
lar, four important features are identified by experts as an IDS
signature for the proposed system, which are listed in Table I.
TABLE I. FEATURES FOR IDS
Feature Description
Source bytes The number of data bytes sent by source IP host
Destination bytes The number of data bytes sent by destination IP host
Count The number of connections to the same hostas the current connection in the past 2 seconds
Dst Host Diff Rate The percentage of connections that ports are different withinthe past 100 connections with the sane destination IP.
Once the features are determined, data regarding a given
network in certain environment need to be collected for model
training. This is typically implemented in stages based on
firstly an attack free network and then different types of
attacks. That is, data regarding normal network traffic is col-
lected first from a threat free condition network environment.
Then, a number of attacks simulating the first type of attack are
artificially launched such that this type of attack is sufficiently
covered by the data set. This process is repeated for every
other type of attacks such that all the classes that need to be
considered are fully covered by the data set. Note that, as the
classification of all attacks is a very challenging, if not impos-
sible, task, only certain types of attacks are considered during
the training data set collection process. However, the proposed
IDS is able to deal with unknown or unconsidered types of
attack with good success, as indicated in experimentation.
B. Rule Base Generation
Given a labelled training data set regarding a particular
network and its environment, a TSK rule base can be generated
to enable intrusion detection using a fuzzy inference system.
The overall rule base generation process is illustrated in Fig. 1.
Without losing generality, suppose that lpl ě 1, l P Nq classes
are labelled in the given training data set, which covers l ´ 1
types of attacks and the normal situation. The proposed system
firstly divides the training data set T into l sub data sets
T1, T2, ¨ ¨ ¨ , Tl , each representing a type of attack or the
normal traffic (i.e., T “ Yls“1Ts). Then, the K-Means, one
of the most widely used clustering algorithm, is employed to
each sub data set to group its data points into clusters based
on their feature values. From this, each determined cluster
is expressed as a fuzzy rule contributing to the constitution
of the TSK rule base. Important sub-procedures in rule base
generation are detailed below.
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Fig. 1. Rule base generation
1) Clustering: The K-Means clustering algorithm is em-
ployed to each sub data set to group similar objects (data
points in the sub data set) into clusters based on the Euclidean
distance. Suppose that ks clusters are needed for sub-data set
Ts. The algorithm starts with the initialisation of ks cluster
centroids, which may be generated randomly or based on some
strategies. Then each data object is allocated to the cluster
whose centroid is the closest from the data object. After that,
the algorithm updates the cluster centroids and reassign each
data object to its closest cluster again. This process is reiterated
until the centroids stabilised or the sum of squared error (SSE)
is minimised. In particular, SSE is defined as follows:
SSE “
csiÿ
j“1
ksÿ
i“1
p‖ xsij ´ vsi ‖q2 , (6)
where xsij is the j
th data point in ith cluster in the sub data
set Ts; vsi is the centre of the i
th cluster in the sub dataset Ts;
csi is the number of data points in i
th cluster of the subset Ts;
and ‖ xsij´vsi ‖ is the Euclidean distance between xsij and vsi .
Note that the value of ks has to be pre-defined to enable
the application of the K-Means algorithm. A number of
approaches have been proposed to determine the value of ks in
the literature, such as the Elbow method [25]. This approach
has been employed in this work, which determines the number
of clusters based on the criteria that adding another cluster
does not give much better modelling of the data set. It is
noteworthy that different extensions, such as fuzzy C-means
and K-medians, have been proposed to extend the K-Means
algorithm. The application of these extensions may be of great
importance for particular types of practical problems, but this
is out of the scope of this paper.
2) Fuzzy Rule Extraction: TSK model takes each deter-
mined cluster of data to form one TSK fuzzy rule. Follow
the last subsection and takes the sub data set Ts as an exam-
ple. As four input attributes are considered in the proposed
IDS, the ith cluster in sub dataset Ts can be represented as
(Asi1 , A
si
2 , A
si
3 , A
si
4 ). The generation of the four fuzzy sets from
csi 4-dimensional data points is detailed below.
Given that only triangular membership functions are
utilised in this work, the core of fuzzy set Asik , k “ t1, 2, 3, 4u
is set as the cluster centre vsik regarding variable xk, that is
asik2 “ pxsijk ` xsijk ` ¨ ¨ ¨ ` xsijkq{csi . The support of the fuzzy
set pasik1, asik3q is expressed as the span of the cluster along this
input dimension, where asik1 is the minimum value in this input
dimension (i.e., asiks “ minpxsijk, xsijk, ...xsijkq), and similarly,
asik3 is the maximum value in this input dimension (i.e.,
asiks “ maxpxsijk, xsijk, ...xsijkq). To facilitate the discussion,
the generation of (Asi1 , A
si
2 ) on two dimensions (x1, x2) for
the ith cluster of the sth sub data set is illustrated in Figure 2
(as two dimension problems can be expressed in a plane for
visualisation and better understanding).
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Fig. 2. Fuzzy representation of a 2-dimensional cluster
In this work, 0-order TSK rules are adopted. All data points
in each cluster share the same class label of an integer number,
which is utilised as the consequent of the corresponding TSK
rule. The final TSK fuzzy rule base is generated by combining
all the extracted rules from all l sub data sets (i.e., T1,
T2, ¨ ¨ ¨ , Tl) as follows:
R11 : IF x1 is A
11
1 and ¨ ¨ ¨ and x4 is A114
THEN z “ Z1
...
R1k1 : IF x1 is A
1k1
1 and ¨ ¨ ¨ and x4 is A1k14
THEN z “ Zn .
...
Rl1 : IF x1 is A
l1
1 and ¨ ¨ ¨ and x4 is Alkl4
THEN z “ Z1
...
Rlkl : IF x1 is A
lkl
1 and ¨ ¨ ¨ and x4 is Alkl4
THEN z “ Zn .
(7)
The number of rules in this rule base equals to the sum of the
numbers of clusters for all the sub data sets (i.e., k1 ` k2 `
...` kl).
C. Intrusion Detection by TSK-Interpolation
The generated TSK rule bases are usually sparse thanks
to the characteristics of network systems and its environment.
Naturally, TSK-interpolation, as briefed in Section II-A, can
be readily used to perform inferences in attack detection. In
order to generate network intrusion alerts in real time, the
system keeps capturing traffic data upon its deployment in a
real network environment. The captured data in real time are
then fed into the proposed system for system updating.
Assumes that the four features of current traffic for a
given network are observed as O “ px1˚ , x2˚ , x3˚ , x4˚ q. From
this input, the TSK-interpolation system firstly calculates the
matching degrees between the given inputs (O) and the an-
tecedents of individual rules utilising Equation 4. Then, the
inference result of the TSK IDS model is produced from
Equation 5. Finally, the numerical consequence values of
the TSK-interpolation system is rounded to a whole number
(symbolic value) which represents the category of the observed
traffic.
Note that fuzzy rule interpolation has been successfully
applied to the development of IDS in a real network environ-
ment [23], as discussed in Section II-B. This system generates
accurate alerts and promotes new fuzzy rules to enhance
the existing sparse rule base. Compared with the D-FRI-
Snort system, which requires the involvement of experts for
fuzzy variable determination and fuzzy rule base initialisation,
the proposed system only requires network experts in the
generation of training data, which implies better applicability.
IV. EXPERIMENTATION
In order to validate and evaluate the proposed system, it is
applied to a well-known data set, the KDD Cup 99 data set,
and thereby to demonstrate its efficacy.
A. The Data Set
The KDD Cup 99 data set is a popular benchmark in the
research field of Intrusion Detection, which includes legitimate
connections and a wide variety of intrusions simulated in
a military network environment [26]. This data set contains
almost 5 millions of data instances with 42 attributes, including
the ‘class’ attribute which indicates whether a given instance
is a normal connection instance or one of the four types of
attacks to be identified (i.e., Normal, Denial of Service Attacks,
User to Root Attacks, Remote to User Attacks, and Probes).
Knowing the inherent issues associated with the data set, such
as the high duplication rate of 78%, the KDD Cup 99 data
set has been further processed to NSL-KDD-99 [26]. This
processed data set includes 125,937 data samples with all the
features of the original data set kept. Thanks to its convenience,
this data set has been utilised in a number pieces of recent
research, such as [27], which is also employed for system
validation and evaluation.
B. Model Construction
In this work, 80% of the data samples randomly chosen
from the NSL-KDD-99 data set are used for system training,
and the rest 20% for testing. Note that there are five possible
labels in the training data set, including Normal, Denial of
Service Attacks (DoS), User to Root Attacks (R2R), Remote
to User Attacks (R2U), and Probes. Five integer numbers are
utilised as the 0-order consequences of TSK rules to represent
the five possible consequences. The five categories and their
corresponding rule consequences, the number of data instances
for each category in the training and testing data sets are listed
in the Table II.
TABLE II. INFORMATION FOR CATEGORIES
Category No. ofTraining Instances
No. of
Testing Instances
TSK rule
Consequence
Normal Traffic 67,343 9711 1
DoS 45,927 5741 2
U2R 52 37 3
R2U 995 2199 4
Probes 11,656 1106 5
A TSK-style rule base was generated from the NSL-KDD
training data set using the approach proposed in Section III-B.
The key steps are summarised below.
[Step 1] Training data set preprocessing: Four important
features have been identified in Section III-A for network
intrusion detection. Therefore, only these four features (which
corresponds to the 5th, 6th, 23rd, and 35th features in the
NSL-KDD-99 data set) were kept and all other feature values
were removed from the training data set.
[Step 2] Data set division: The training data set was
divided into five sub data sets such that all the data instances
in each sub data set were of the same ‘class’ attribute value.
[Step 3] Clustering: The standard K-Means clustering
algorithm was employed to partition the given training data
samples into multiple clusters, and the Elbow method was
used to determine the number of clusters in this work. Taking
the sub data set for DoS as an example, the SSE values for
different cluster numbers were calculated as shown in Figure 3.
It is clear from this figure that the elbow point is 4, which was
taken as the value of k when applying K-Means. The cluster
numbers for other sub data sets were identified in the same
way, with the results listed in Table III.
Fig. 3. Identification of the number of clusters using the Elbow method
TABLE III. CLUSTER NUMBERS FOR EACH SUB DATA SET
Type of Data Set CorrespondingConsequent
Determined
Number of K
Normal Traffic 1 21
DoS 2 4
U2R 3 3
R2U 4 6
Probes 5 6
[Step 4] Rule base generation: Each cluster was repre-
sented as a fuzzy rule. Therefore, 40 rules in total were gen-
erated forming the final rule base in the format of Equation 7.
For instance, the third extracted rule from sub data set of DoS
can be expressed as:
R3 : IF x1 is p520, 1032, 1480q and x2 is p0, 0, 0q
and x3 is p158, 486, 511q and x4 is p0, 0.02, 0.2q
THEN z “ 2 .
(8)
C. Experimental Results
Once the rule base is generated, the model is then applied
to the testing data set with the result shown in Table IV. This
table also includes the results generated from several existing
well-known methods [28] for comparative study, including the
decision tree, Naive Bayes, and back-propagation neural net-
work (BPNN). The proposed approach, in general, outperforms
other approaches. In particular, the approach performs the best
for the classification of three classes, including Normal Traffic,
R2U and Probes. The accuracy rate for DoS from the proposed
approach is worse than those from all other approaches by a
marginal difference. The classified result for the class of U2R
from the proposed approach is better than that from Naive
Bayes, but worse than those from decision tree and BPNN.
TABLE IV. RESULTS COMPARISON
Decision
Tree (%)
Naive
Bayes (%)
BPNN
(%)
Proposed
System (%)
Normal Traffic 91.22 89.22 89.75 96.81
DoS 99.84 99.69 99.79 98.15
U2R 50.00 25.00 50.00 45.71
R2U 33.33 46.15 57.14 75.99
Probes 50.00 52.61 60.94 74.11
The proposed system has a good generalisation ability. In
order to evaluate the ability of the proposed system in handling
uncovered types of threats in the training data set, another
pre-processed sub data set is adopted for testing purposes. In
particular, this data set contains 3,220 data instances extracted
from original KDD Cup 99 data set. This testing data set is
also provided by [26], and the types of threats in this testing
data set are not covered by NSL-KDD (which has been used
to train the TSK model). The accuracy of detection of un-
known types of treats is shown in Table V with a comparison
with the result led by naive Bayes. This comparative study
demonstrates that the proposed system is able to generate a
much better result.
TABLE V. RESULT OF UNKNOWN INTRUSIONS
Accuracy by
Proposed System (%)
Accuracy by
Naive Bayes (%)
74.41 55.77
D. Analysis and Discussion
The experimental results show the potential of the proposed
approach, in that it generally outperforms other approaches
regarding the classification of the three classes. It is noteworthy
that the poor performance on the prediction of class U2R is
led by the very small sub data set, given that there are only 52
data instances are associated with this class. The imbalance of
data set significantly limits the performance of the inference
model. Better data capture strategies are therefore appealing
in the real world situation to avoid this situation.
Although many fuzzy inference systems have been em-
ployed to detect attacks form unlimited network connections,
they all require a dense fuzzy rule base to enable the per-
formance of fuzzy inferences. However, a dense rule base
covering the unlimited network connections is practically hard,
if not impossible, to be obtained, which limits the effectiveness
of these approaches. Also, IDSs developed from conventional
fuzzy inference systems with sparse knowledge bases may
result in unexpected system outputs. Thanks to the relaxation
on the requirements of rule bases from TSK-interpolation,
reasonable intrusion alerts can still be generated when a given
observation is not overlapped with any rule antecedents, which
significantly improves the applicability of fuzzy inference
systems in the field of network intrusion detection.
V. CONCLUSIONS
This paper presented a data-driven network intrusion de-
tection system, by employing the recently proposed TSK-
interpolation approach. The experiment results using the
benchmark data set KDD-99 demonstrated that the proposed
system is not only able to successfully generate security alerts
for known attack types, but also to detect the unknown types
of treats with good success thanks to its good generalisation
ability. This work can be enhanced by employing the recently
proposed rule base generation approach [29] to generate a
sparse rule base directly from very complex training data sets,
and rule base adaptation approach [30] to allow the rule base
to be adapted and enhanced along with the operation of the
IDS system. Also, the proposed work is developed using TSK-
interpolation, it is worthwhile to investigate how the proposed
system may be developed by employing other fuzzy interpola-
tion approaches with Mamdani-style rules bases. In addition,
as the DSS Cup 99 is an old data set, real-world applications
are desired for more system evaluation and validation.
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